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Regardless of the type of maintenance performed on aircraft, instructions are to be used to provide the aviation
technicians completing the maintenance activities with guidance on, and an outline of, the maintenance items to be
performed and completed. However, the use of instructions does not guarantee the correct and proper completion of
the maintenance activities as the instructions may be erroneous and/or maintenance personnel can misunderstand,
misinterpret, or improperly follow the procedures outlined. Resulting maintenance errors can potentially result in
aircraft accidents, as illustrated by Air Midwest Flight 5481. With the purpose of understanding how human factors
associated with written maintenance instructions have contributed to aircraft accidents, the researchers qualitatively
analyzed, using the people (P), environment (E), actions (A), resources (R) – PEAR – framework, 12 aircraft
accidents that occurred from January 1, 2003, through December 31, 2017, under Part 121 or Part 135 operations in
the United States that had maintenance instruction-related errors as contributing or causal factors. The detailed
accident information, including causal factors, were retrieved from the aircraft accident reports provided by the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The findings indicated that maintenance activities, specifically in
terms of the adequacy and proper use of maintenance instructions, are largely impacted by human factor elements,
such as the overall organizational environment and the resources available.
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As mandated by the United States Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), virtually every
U.S. registered aircraft operating in the United States airspace is subjected to periodic
maintenance activities (Title 14 C.F.R. § 91.405, 2011). However, the extent of the mandated
maintenance activities is dependent upon the exact type of operations of each aircraft. On one
hand, general aviation (GA) aircraft operating under Title 14 C.F.R. Part 91 are commonly
subject to maintenance activities as part of annual inspections and 100-hour inspections. On the
other hand, aircraft operating under Title 14 C.F.R. Part 121 and Title 14 C.F.R. Part 135 are
subjected to maintenance activities per continuous airworthiness inspection programs (Title 14
C.F.R. § 91.409, 2011). Despite the different types of aircraft inspections and maintenance
activities that are to be performed, all have one aspect in common, namely the requirement to use
a form of documentation or instruction, such as maintenance manuals, checklists, and/or job
cards that outline the details of the task at hand (Title 14 C.F.R. § 43.13, 2011). However, these
maintenance instructions have the potential to negatively impact aviation safety. For instance,
when poorly prepared, maintenance instructions could be a contributing factor to aircraft
accidents (Hobbs, 2008). The maintenance instructions and documentation, amongst others, can
present technical errors, be hard to follow, describe procedures in an unclear manner, or provide
awkward instructions, which can result in procedural errors – when procedures are not executed
as intended – and/or violations – when procedures are deliberately and intentionally not followed
(International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO], 2002). Thus, the risk of improperly
performing maintenance activities, even with the guidance of technical documentation, is still
present. In situations where maintenance activities are performed erroneously, a so-called
maintenance error is said to have occurred (Dhillon & Liu, 2006). A listing of maintenancerelated aircraft accidents prepared by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) illustrates that
maintenance errors, regardless of how minor or insignificant a specific maintenance item might
seem, can have serious effects and consequences, with the potential of creating major safety
issues and result in fatal accidents, as was observed during the accident of Air Midwest Flight
5481 (FAA, 2018; National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 2004).
Literature Review
Impact of Aviation Maintenance on Aviation Safety
A prime example of the importance and impact of maintenance documentation on
aviation safety, especially of misunderstanding maintenance instructions, is provided by the
accident of Air Midwest Flight 5481.
Air Midwest Flight 5481. On January 8, 2008, a Beechcraft 1900D operated by Air
Midwest as US Airways Express crashed shortly after takeoff from Charlotte-Douglas
International Airport (CLT) in North Carolina, killing 21 people aboard, including two flight
crewmembers. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) (NTSB, 2004, p. x) identified
the “airplane’s loss of pitch control during takeoff” as the probable cause of the mishap, further
elaborating that the loss of pitch control was due to the improper rigging of the elevator control
system and a Center of Gravity (C.G.) too far aft of the certified limit. Two days prior to the
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accident, the elevator system control cables of the affected aircraft were examined during a
maintenance check, and the tension of these control cables was found to be too low. In order to
adjust the tension, the entire elevator rigging procedure was supposed to be followed as there
was no individual job card specifically focusing on adjusting the tension of the control cables.
However, both the mechanic and the supervisor misunderstood the procedures, and believed that
only the steps in the elevator rigging procedure that focused on the tension adjustment had to be
followed (NTSB, 2004). During the post-accident review the mechanics stated that “steps c, f, g,
h, i, j, n, and s were not required because those steps were only necessary for cable replacement
and not for cable tensioning” (NTSB, 2004, p. 23). However, skipping these steps resulted in an
inadequate restriction of the aircraft’s nose down travel, and thus contributed to the accident
(Hobbs, 2008; NTSB, 2004). Through the example given by Air Midwest Flight 5481, the impact
that maintenance instructions have on the proper completion of maintenance activities, especially
when not properly understood, are illustrated, and the risks associated therewith are highlighted.
Aviation Maintenance and Safety
The human element, including flight personnel as well as personnel on the ground, such
as aircraft technicians, has a great impact on safety in the aviation industry (FAA, 2018; Hobbs,
2004; Oster, Strong, & Zorn, 2013). Human error has been cited as a causal factor for between
75% to 80% of all aviation accidents, and around 12% of this proportion of aircraft accidents are
linked to aircraft maintenance activities (FAA, 2018). As the aircraft maintenance system and
environment are very complex and intricate, human errors should be expected (Latorella &
Prabhu, 2000). According to Hobbs (2008), even if improper maintenance activities are not
identified as the primary cause of an accident, they may still have played an important role
therein.
In the five-year span between 1996 and 2001, 1,016 aviation mishaps with maintenance
issues cited as causal factors were registered in the Maintenance Error Information Management
System (MEIMS), a database which combines FAA, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), and U.S. Navy maintenance error data (Krulak, 2004). Similarly, in the
Aviation Safety Review for 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)
highlighted aircraft maintenance as a prominent primary cause for airplane and helicopter
accidents, serious incidents, and high severity occurrences (Civil Aviation Authority [CAA],
2017). The significance of maintenance on the safety of the aviation industry is further
highlighted by the records of NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database. From
the 54,318 incidents reported in the database for the time period between 2010 and 2020, 1,661
reports reference maintenance-related procedural violations (ASRS, n.d.).
One important aspect of maintenance-related errors is that they can exist without being
visible or discovered for a prolonged period of time, and consequently are more latent and less
obvious than other error-types (FAA, 2018). In the past, the search for a root cause frequently
stopped when the last person that was in touch with, or worked on, the damaged component is
found, instead of continuing the search deeper into the causes for the failure (Hibit & Marx,
1994). However, with the introduction of the continuing analysis and surveillance system
(CASS) – an approach now required for airlines in the United States to prevent maintenance
errors – performing a root cause analysis is a mandatory component of airlines’ maintenance
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programs (McFadden & Worrells, 2012). While it is useful to know what the actual errorcondition was, it is more crucial to understand the reason why a specific error occurred, as it
allows to understand and analyze the root causes of the error (Hobbs, 2008).
Maintenance documentation is a critical aspect for the proper completion of aircraft
maintenance activities. After reviewing 2,360 incidents listed in the ASRS database that occurred
between 1996 and 2003, Hobbs and Kanki (2008) indicated that maintenance manuals were a
common factor among the reports analyzed. Additionally, the maintenance error history (MEH)
model presented by Rashid, Place, & Braithwaite (2013) illustrates that information, as provided
in aircraft documents and manuals, technical compact discs (CDs), or bulletins, could be an
error-trigger during the aircraft maintenance process. These trends were further reflected by
Hobbs (2008), where elements related to maintenance documentation, such as poor designs or
procedures, were identified to be contributing factors to maintenance errors and incidents. The
organization of these sources of information is crucial and can result in an error-producing
condition, as errors can occur when attempting to retrieve information from “confusing,
misleading or excessively cluttered documentation and charts” (ICAO, 2002, p. 2-6).
The importance of aircraft maintenance activities and their impact on aviation safety is
further highlighted by the FAA (2018) and Hobbs (2008) through a listing of aircraft accidents
and incidents whose causes are related to maintenance issues and errors. The FAA (2018) and
Hobbs (2008) incident and accident listings are combined in Table 1.
Human Factors in Aviation
Most of the aircraft accident literature has focused on the analysis and modeling of
human factors (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001), their impact on aircraft accidents (Australian
Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI), 1996; Dambier & Hinkelbein, 2006; Daramola, 2014;
Kelly & Efthymiou, 2019; Kharoufah, Murray, Baxter, & Wild, 2018; Li & Harris, 2006; Li,
Harris, & Yu, 2008; Liu, Chi, & Li, 2013; Mendonca, Huang, & Keller, 2017; Shappell &
Wiegmann, 2004; Shappell, Detwiler, Holcomb, Hackworth, & Boquet, 2006), and accident
prevention methods (Taneja, 2002). More specifically, the literature is mostly centered on the
aircrew-aspects of human factors. Examples include a report by the [Australian] Bureau of Air
Safety Investigation (BASI) focused on pilot-related human factors as causes of aircraft
accidents (BASI, 1996) and Taneja’s (2002) review of methods to investigate and prevent of
human factors as they relate to aircraft accidents. Furthermore, Wiegmann and Shappell (2001)
studied the effectiveness of using the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
(HFACS) framework, placing special emphasis on the identification of human factors in aircraft
accidents and incidents.
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Table 1
Aircraft Accidents and Incidents Due to Maintenance Related Issues
Mishap
Flight Identifier
Year
Maintenance Related Cause
Type
Eastern Airlines 855

1983

Incident

Installation of chip detectors without O-rings

Japan Airlines 123

1985

Accident

Improperly performed repair on rear pressure bulkhead

Aloha Airlines 243

1988

Accident

Unidentified disbonding and fatigue damage during
inspection

British Airways 5390

1990

Accident

Improper bolts used during windscreen installation

Excalibur Airways,
G-KMAM

1993

Incident

Lack of knowledge of Airbus flap change procedures

Emery Worldwide 228

2001

Incident

Improperly installed landing gear extension
components, and failure to detect mistake

China Airlines 611

2002

Accident

Metal fatigue resulting from improper maintenance

Air Midwest 5481

2003

Accident

Improper rigging of the elevator control system during
maintenance

Colgan Air 9446

2003

Accident

Improper replacement of cable and inadequate
functional check

American Airlines
1400

2007

Accident

Improper engine manual engine start-up procedure used
by maintenance personnel

Note: Adapted from “An Overview of Human Factors in Aviation Maintenance” by A. Hobbs, 2008, pp. 3-8
(https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/27818/hf_ar-2008-055.pdf). Copyright 2008 by the Australian Transport Safety
Bureau; “Aviation Maintenance Technician Handbook – General” by Federal Aviation Administration, 2018, p.1433 (https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aircraft/media/amt_general_handbook.pdf).
Copyright 2018 by the Federal Aviation Administration.

The HFACS model has since been applied in a variety of studies to understand the human
factor elements associated with aircraft accidents, in both, civil and military operations. Through
the application of the HFACS framework, the criticality of the human element in aviation is
further emphasized, as skill-based errors, perception errors, decision errors, violations, and crew
resource management are quoted as frequent aircraft accident causal factors (Dambier &
Hinkelbein, 2006; Daramola, 2014; Kelly & Efthymiou, 2019; Li & Harris, 2006; Liu et al.,
2013; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001; Shappell et al., 2006; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001).
Overall, in general aviation (GA) and commercial aviation, skill-based errors dominate, causing
approximately 80% and 70% of unsafe acts, respectively. On the military side, however, the
contribution of skill-based errors is approximately equal to that of decision errors (Shappell &
Wiegmann, 2004). By combining the HFACS framework with statistical methods, Li et al.
(2008) determined that for safety interventions to be impactful, they are to be implemented at the
Level three and Level four of the HFACS framework, relating to supervisory and organizational
processes, respectively. Specifically, unsafe supervision (Level three) refers to latent failures
resulting from inadequate acts of the supervisory echelons, while organizational influences
(Level four) is tied to managerial and upper-level decisions and actions (Wiegmann & Shappell,
2001).
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Additional human factors models with applications to aviation have also been developed
and applied. Yang and Fan (2016) introduced a novel human factors model, namely the PEART
(people, environment, actions, resources, and time) model. This model is based on the PEAR
model, but with an additional element – time, as it is critical to also consider how time impacts
an operation and the human factors associated therewith (Yang & Fan, 2016). Further, Zhang,
Wang, Luo, & Tang (2013) created a statistical model based on Bayesian network theory to
represent causality via conditional probability of the impact of human factors on civil aviation
incidents.
Research on the human factors of the aircraft maintenance industry includes studies
focusing on their impact on ergonomics and the maintainability of aircraft (Bernard, Zare, Sagot,
& Paquin, 2020), relationship to errors (Padil, Said, & Azizan, 2018), influential factors (Jaiswal,
Dalkilic, Verma, & Singh, 2019; Santos & Melicio, 2019), incorporation into safety management
system (SMS) practices (Miller & Mrusek, 2019), and approaches to map the risks thereof
(Kucuk, 2019). Only few reports usually issued by government-related agencies like the FAA in
the United States and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) in Australia have focused
on further analyzing and researching aircraft accidents with regards to their relationship to
maintenance activities, as presented by the FAA (2018) and Hobbs (2008). However, in these
reports, the accidents are overviewed in a general and broad manner or the focus thereof is not
explicit to accidents caused by, or related to, maintenance instruction-related issues. Goldman,
Fiedler, & King (2002) obtained reports of maintenance-related GA accidents that occurred
between 1988 and 1997 from the NTSB. The associated data were analyzed, and the accidents
were classified into categories by type of aircraft involved, installation error (i.e. what was the
type of maintenance error), aircraft system affected, certification of the mechanics, and
operational impact (Goldman et al., 2002). While this research provides an understanding of the
frequencies of the relative categories, it does not present details on the causes of the maintenance
errors analyzed or an analysis of the human factors involved.
The PEAR Model
The PEAR model provides a framework to characterize human factors – the relationship
between people, their capabilities, and their environment and activities (FAA, 2018; ICAO,
2002). Specifically, the PEAR model considers four elements that impact human factors in the
area of aviation maintenance, namely people (P), environment (E), actions (A), and resources (R)
(FAA, 2018).
The people element of the PEAR model refers to the individuals that perform the
maintenance activities (FAA, 2018). As not every individual involved in the maintenance
activities presents the same characteristics, maintenance operations and activities have to respect
each individual’s limitations (ICAO, 2002). The PEAR model considers physical characteristics,
physiological, psychological, as well as psychosocial characteristics (FAA, 2018; ICAO, 2002;
Johnson & Maddox, 2007). By extension, as a critical element to human capability and
performance, and a fundamental component of human factor analysis, fatigue – both from a
physical as well as mental perspective – is further highlighted and studied under the people
element of the PEAR model (Johnson & Maddox, 2007). The complete list of human factors
characteristics considered under the people element of the PEAR model is outlined in Table 2.
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Table 2
PEAR Elements Classification
Physical Elements
Physical size
Gender
Age
Strength
Sensory limitations

P - People
Psychological Elements
Physiological Elements
Workload
Experience
Knowledge
Training
Attitude
Mental/emotional state

Nutritional factors
Health
Lifestyle
Fatigue
Chemical dependency

Psychosocial Elements
Interpersonal conflicts
Financial hardships
Personal loss

E – Environment
Physical Environment

Organizational Environment
Personnel
Corporate culture
Morale
Supervision
Company size
Profitability
Crew structure
Labor-management relations
Pressures

Weather
Location of activities
Shift
Workspace
Safety
Sound level
Lightning characteristics

A - Actions
Steps required to perform and complete a task
The number of people involved to complete a task
Sequence of activities
Requirements
Communication
Attitude
Certification

Information control
Knowledge

Skill
Inspection

R – Resources
Manuals
Computer software systems
Tools
Test equipment
Work stands and lifts
Fixtures
Other people
Task lightning
Materials
Ground handling equipment
Quality systems
Training
Procedures and work cards
Paperwork and associated signoffs
Note: Adapted from “Aviation Maintenance Technician Handbook – General” by Federal Aviation Administration,
2018, pp.14-10 – 14-12
(https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aircraft/media/amt_general_handbook.pdf).
Copyright 2018 by the Federal Aviation Administration; “A PEAR shaped model for better human factors” by W.B.
Johnson and M.E. Maddox, 2007, pp. 20-21
(https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/maintenance_hf/library/documents/media/reports_publications/pear_civil_avi
ation_training_magazine_4-07.pdf).

As shown in Table 2, the environment in the area of maintenance activities includes both
the physical as well as the organizational environment (Johnson & Maddox, 2007). The physical
environment refers to a series of physical conditions that can impact the maintenance activities,
while the organizational environment refers to organizational characteristics that define a
company, and thus, the workplace (FAA, 2018). From an organizational perspective, as
highlighted by the HFACS model, decisions taken in the upper levels of management – such as
the allocation of resources or implemented policies and procedures – have an impact on the
frontline actions, and consequently impact safety (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001).
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The actions element of the PEAR model refers to all actions and activities that are
performed and/or completed as part of the aviation maintenance operations. Actions range from
the requirements needed to complete the maintenance activities, to the actual steps performed
during the maintenance activities (FAA, 2018; Johnson & Maddox, 2007). Within the context of
the HFACS framework, the actual steps performed, if leading to an accident, can be classified as
unsafe acts of operator, in the form of errors and/or violations (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001),
following the definitions afore-provided. Table 2 highlights the human factors characteristics
considered under the actions element of the PEAR model.
In the most basic sense, resources refers to any element that is required to complete
maintenance activities, as shown in Table 2. This includes both tangible as intangible elements,
such as tools and training, respectively (FAA, 2018). Under the HFACS model, resource
management is classified as a subset of organizational influences, the fourth level of failure
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). When analyzing the resources element of the PEAR model,
however, it is important to identify additional resources that are required, rather than merely
characterizing existing resources (FAA, 2018). The allocation of resources is dictated by safety
and cost-effectiveness objectives (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001).
Significance of the Study
Often times, safety hazards that can lead to future aircraft accidents can be eliminated or
mitigated after an accident when they are properly understood and proactive action is taken
(ICAO, 2016; Sumwalt & Dalton, 2014). As presented in the literature review, aviation
maintenance and its impact on safety is a known and frequently studied discipline,
simultaneously highlighting maintenance documentation as a risk factor. However, the studies
presented do not focus on specific accidents and incidents in which maintenance documentation,
as a sub-element of maintenance activities, has impacted and threatened aviation safety.
Consequently, researching aircraft accidents that were caused by, or related to maintenance
instructions, and understanding recurring themes amongst the characteristics of the maintenance
activities performed is expected to allow the industry to recognize and more effectively address
the risks and factors associated with aircraft maintenance instructions. Through the expected
increased understanding obtained through this research, proactive action can be taken to improve
the area of maintenance instructions, with the objective of improving the overall safety of the
aviation industry.
Research Questions
This study was an attempt to understand the underlying factors of aircraft accidents which
occurred under Part 121 and Part 135 operations from 2003 to 2017 and were caused by
maintenance errors related to, or induced by, written maintenance instructions, through the
application of the PEAR model. Specifically, the following research questions were addressed:
1. What are the characteristics of the maintenance activities that could be improperly
performed due to issues presented and caused by written maintenance instructions?
2. What are the underlying human factor-related causes of the maintenance errors induced
by written maintenance instructions issues?

http://ojs.library.okstate.edu/osu/index.php/cari

8

Collegiate Aviation Review International

Methodology
To answer the research questions, data from aircraft accidents that occurred between
January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2017 under Part 121 and Part 135 operations, and that were
caused by, or related to, issues with written aircraft maintenance instructions and documentation
were obtained from the NTSB aviation accidents databases (NTSB, n.d.-a; NTSB, n.d.-b). The
gathered data were used to study the human factors elements that were related to the
maintenance documentation issues through the application of the PEAR model.
Data Collection
Similar to Goldman et al. (2002), the aircraft accident data from 15 years were obtained
through the online aviation accidents database (NTSB, n.d.-a). To query only the accidents of
interests, the search filters on the NTSB website were adjusted to include accidents classified by
the NTSB as “airplane” accidents occurring in the United States under Part 121 and Part 135
operations from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2017. A key word search for “maintenance”
was conducted to obtain only the reports from accidents in which the maintenance activities were
investigated.
Data Analysis
The list resulting from the NTSB search included the accidents that occurred within the
specified time range, under Part 121 and Part 135 operations, and whose reports have the
keyword “maintenance” included. This included any mention of maintenance within the accident
reports, and consequently did not specifically sort out accidents related to issues with
maintenance instructions and documentation. To sort out the accidents that were related to, or
caused by, maintenance instructions issues, the final or preliminary accident reports, depending
on availability, were read and analyzed. After manually filtering out the accidents that were
caused by maintenance documentation-related issues, the strategy used by Goldman et al. (2002)
was followed. The selected accidents were coded in different categories in order to obtain
accident demographic information. In this study, the accidents were coded in the categories
described below.
The accidents were coded with respect to the number and types of injuries, as provided
by the NTSB report. The types of injuries are fatal, serious, minor, and none (NTSB, 2013; Title
49 C.F.R. § 830.2, 2011). The accidents were further coded in terms of the level of damage to the
aircraft, as provided by the NTSB accident report. Aircraft damage can be coded into four
categories, as provided and defined by the NTSB (2006): destroyed, substantial, minor, and
none.
The Aircraft System Affected category identifies and classifies the aircraft system that the
improper maintenance activity was taking place on. The aircraft system categories are adopted
from Goldman et al. (2002), and are: flight controls, powerplant, landing gear, flight/navigation
instruments, electrical system, fuselage, rotor system, wing (vertical and horizontal), fire warning
system, air conditioning/heat/pressurization/oxygen, and anti-/de-ice systems.
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The Physical Description of Errors category allows the classification of the aircraft
accident in terms of the physical maintenance action that was performed incorrectly. The
categories used were adopted from Hobbs (2008) and are: omission, commission, and timing and
precision. According to Hobbs (2008), an omission refers to not performing a required action, as
for example not safety wiring two bolts together, or omitting a series of steps in a procedure.
Commission, on the other hand, refers to “[when] an action is performed that should not have
been performed” (Hobbs, 2008, p. 10), as for example improperly connecting the end terminals
of an electrical device. Lastly, timing and precision refers to actions that were “performed at the
wrong time, in the wrong order, or without the necessary level of precision” (Hobbs, 2008, p.
19). Using the definitions provided by Hobbs (2008), examples of timing and precision errors
could include connecting the negative lead of a battery first or inflating a tire to the wrong
pressure.
The Maintenance Activity category identifies the type of maintenance that has been
performed on the aircraft. The coding used was adapted from the NTSB Aviation Coding Manual
(NTSB, 1998) and from Goldman et al. (2002). The categories used in the analysis are:
adjustment, alignment, annual inspection, 100-hour inspection, balancing, calibration,
compliance with an Airworthiness Directive (AD), design change, installation, inspection,
lubrication, modification, major repair, major alternation, overhaul, pressurizing,
rebuild/remanufacture, replacement, service bulletin (SB)/letter, and service aircraft/equipment
(Goldman et al, 2002; NTSB, 1998).
Accidents that fit into more than one sub-category within the five categories provided
above were counted in both sub-categories. For example, if two aircraft systems were affected in
an accident, both of the systems were counted as systems affected. The frequency of the type of
operation, type of injuries, aircraft damage, system affected, physical description of errors, and
maintenance activity was then computed. Following the example provided by Goldman et al.
(2002), the frequencies of each category were used to obtain an overall understanding of the
demographic of the accidents that were caused by, or related to, maintenance instruction and
documentation issues.
PEAR Model
The human factors that resulted in, or affected, the maintenance instructions-related
issues were analyzed through the application of the PEAR model. Researchers utilized the PEAR
model to identify the individual factors that affected the maintenance activities, focusing on the
maintenance documentation issues that were improperly completed. More precisely, the NTSB
reports of the selected accidents were carefully reviewed by the researchers to identify the
frequency of the themes and categories of the PEAR model. The themes identified under the
Results section reflect the human factors categories from the PEAR model, as outlined in the
above-presented Table 2. The researchers aimed to identify said categories and themes in the
selected NTSB reports to obtain a count of the human factors present in the accident reports
analyzed. To reduce the potential impact of bias, the methodology implemented was based on the
methods presented in previous studies focusing on aviation human factors and maintenance
errors, as introduced in the Literature Review. Furthermore, the classification was guided by the
researchers’ previous experience in the field of aviation safety and human factors.
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Research Questions
To answer Research Question 1, the information obtained from the demographic analysis
was used as it provides data regarding the characteristics of these accidents. Specifically, a
frequency analysis of the different sub-categories previously identified for the system affected,
physical description of errors, and maintenance activity categories was performed. Through this
analysis, recurring themes in terms of maintenance activity characteristics can be identified and
discussed.
Research Question 2 was answered through the results from the PEAR analysis.
Specifically, a frequency analysis was performed on the various PEAR elements and recurring
themes amongst the people, environment, action, and resources human factor elements that were
identified. The results from the frequency analysis and the recurring themes were used as the
basis for the underlying maintenance human factor-related causes of the selected accidents.
Results
Eighty-five Part 121 accidents and 196 Part 135 accidents from the NTSB databases
initially matched the aforementioned search criteria. Using the manual selection process, five
Part 121 and seven Part 135 accidents were identified to have maintenance instruction-related
issues as a causal factor. Table 3 provides an overview of the selected accidents.
Table 3
Selected Part 121 and Part 135 Accidents Overview
Accident

Date

Operation

Cause Related to Instructions

DCA03MA022

01/08/2003

Part 121

Improper understanding of instructions

DEN04LA023

11/18/2003

Part 135

Improper maintenance instructions

LAX05LA244

07/22/2005

Part 135

Failure to follow maintenance instructions

NYC06FA128

05/30/2006

Part 121

Inadequate maintenance instructions

DCA06FA058

07/28/2006

Part 121

Inadequate maintenance instructions

CHI07LA043

12/17/2006

Part 135

Improper maintenance instructions

DCA07MA310

09/28/2007

Part 121

Improper use of maintenance instructions

CHI08LA071

01/09/2008

Part 121

Failure to follow maintenance instructions

MIA08LA079

03/15/2008

Part 135

Failure to follow maintenance instructions

CEN10LA389

07/08/2010

Part 135

Failure to follow maintenance instructions

WPR12FA332

07/28/2012

Part 135

Failure to follow maintenance instructions

WPR14FA068

12/11/2013

Part 135

Improper understanding of instructions
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An overview of the selected Part 121 and Part 135 accidents including the accident
number, operation type, aircraft damage, aircraft system affected, physical description of the
error, and maintenance activity are provided in Table 4. Both, the Part 121 and Part 135 accident
detailed descriptive statistics based on the outlined parameters were calculated and are presented
in Table 5. The analyzed accidents resulted in a total of 22 fatalities – one fatality was reported in
a Part 135 accident (NTSB, n.d.-f) and 21 fatalities were reported in a Part 121 accident (NTSB,
2004). In approximately 80% of all selected accidents, the aircraft received substantial damage,
while in the remaining cases the aircraft were found to be destroyed. The three individual
systems most frequently affected by the improper maintenance in Part 121 and Part 135
accidents were the landing gear – accounting for 50% of accidents, powerplant – accounting for
approximately 33% of the accidents, and flight controls – accounting for approximately 16% of
the accidents. The majority of the accidents, specifically 60% and 75% of the Part 121 and Part
135 accidents, respectively, were caused by acts of omission, where a required maintenance
activity or item was not completed. The improper maintenance actions were completed as part of
seven different maintenance activities: adjustment, airworthiness directive (AD) compliance,
inspections, service bulletin/letter implementations, overhaul, replacement, and service of
aircraft and equipment. Three of the maintenance actions categories – adjustment, replacement,
and service of aircraft and equipment – overlap between both, Part 121 and Part 135 accidents.
Analysis of the Accidents Applying the PEAR Framework
Table 6 lists the PEAR elements that were identified for each accident based on the
information provided in the NTSB aircraft accident reports. All but two PEAR items were
selected from the previously provided PEAR item list. The PEAR items listed in Table 6 as
“Maintenance action improperly completed” and “Maintenance action not completed” under the
Action PEAR column were not provided in the list created based on the FAA (2018)
documentation nor Johnson and Maddox (2007). These elements were added by the researchers
to more accurately reflect the accident information outlined in the NTSB aircraft accident
reports. Some of the reports did not provide additional details on the accident causal factors other
than outlining that the maintenance items provided in the maintenance documentation were not
completed or completed improperly. Thus, these two categories account for the lack of detail in
the NTSB accident reports while still providing an indication of the causal accident factors
related to maintenance instructions.
The PEAR analysis results are synthesized in Table 7 to reflect the frequency of the
PEAR items identified and their occurrence (Part 121 vs. Part 135 accidents). The most frequent
PEAR element amongst Part 121 accidents as well as amongst both operation types together is
Resources, with 10 and 16 occurrences, respectively. The most frequent PEAR element amongst
Part 135 accidents is “Action”, with seven occurrences. The least occurring PEAR element is
Environment with a single occurrence from a Part 121 accident. Additionally, no People or
Environment PEAR element items were identified for Part 135 accidents. The most frequent
individual PEAR element item is the Resources item “Procedures and work cards”, with eight
occurrences total - four occurrences from each, Part 121 and Part 135 accidents. The Action item
“Maintenance action not completed” is the only other individual PEAR element item with four
occurrences from one accident category, in this case from Part 135 accidents. All remaining
PEAR element items occur once or twice per operation type.
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Table 4
Selected Part 121 and Part 135 Accidents Descriptive Information
Accident

Operation

Injuries

Fatalities

Level of
Damage

Aircraft System
Affected

Physical
Description of
Error

Maintenance
Activity

Part 121 Accidents
CHI08LA071

Part 121

-

-

Substantial

Powerplant

Omission

Replacement

DCA07MA310

Part 121

-

-

Substantial

Powerplant

Commission

Service

DCA06FA058

Part 121

-

-

Substantial

Landing Gear

Omission

Overhaul

NYC06FA128

Part 121

1 – Serious

-

Substantial

Landing Gear

Timing & Precision

Service

DCA03MA022

Part 121

1 – Minor

21

Destroyed

Flight Controls

Omission

Adjustment

Part 135 Accidents
WPR14FA068

Part 135

3 – Serious;
5 – Minor

1

Destroyed

Powerplant

Omission

Service Bulletin;
Inspection

WPR12FA332

Part 135

-

-

Substantial

Flight Controls

Timing & Precision

Airworthiness
Directive

CEN10LA389

Part 135

-

-

Substantial

Landing Gear

Omission

Replacement

MIA08LA079

Part 135

-

-

Substantial

Landing Gear

Timing & Precision;
Omission

Adjustment

CHI07LA043

Part 135

-

-

Substantial

Landing Gear

Omission

Inspection;
Adjustment;
Replacement

LAX05LA244

Part 135

-

-

Substantial

Powerplant

Omission

Inspection

DEN04LA023

Part 135

-

-

Substantial

Landing Gear

Omission

Service
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Table 5
Distribution of Accident Descriptive Criteria by Operation Category
Categories
Sub-Categories
Part 121
Fatal
6.954%
Serious
0.331%
Fatalities & Injuries
Minor
0.331%
None
92.384%
Destroyed
20%
Substantial
80%
Level of Damage
Minor
None
Aircraft System
Affected
Physical Description
of Error

Maintenance
Activity

Flight Controls
Powerplant
Landing Gear
Omission
Commission
Timing & Precision
Airworthiness Directive
Inspection
Service Bulletin/Letter
Overhaul
Replacement
Service Aircraft/Equipment

20%
40%
40%
60%
20%
20%
20%
20%
40%

Part 135
4.166%
12.500%
25%
58.333%
14.286 %
85.714%
-

All Accidents Combined
6.748%
1.227%
2.147%
89.877%
16.666%
83.333%
-

14.286%
28.571%
57.143%
75%
25%
10%
30%
10%
20%
10%

16.666%
33.333%
50%
69.231%
7.692%
23.077%
6.666%
20%
6.666%
6.666%
20%
20%

Discussion
The characteristics of the improperly performed maintenance activities are determined
based on the affected aircraft systems, the physical description of the errors, and the maintenance
activity itself, as summarized in Table 5. Relating to aircraft systems, the landing gear is the
system most susceptible to be involved in instruction-related inadequate maintenance activities.
The spread of affected aircraft systems, however, is narrow, as only two other systems presented
maintenance-related issues caused by the maintenance instructions, namely the powerplant and
flight control systems. While the specific relative frequency of the systems involved differs, the
powerplant, flight controls, and landing gear were similarly ranked amongst the most frequent
aircraft systems involved in accidents by Goldman et al. (2002). The results obtained,
nevertheless, need to be considered in relation to the framework of the analysis, and are not
indicative of other systems not being subjected to instruction-induced faulty maintenance.
Specifically, the analysis performed only considers maintenance issues related to aircraft
accidents. Consequently, the system failure needs to be significant to trigger an accident-causing
fault. Therefore, in context, the criticality of adequate maintenance for, and the importance of
maintenance instructions of, the flight control, powerplant, and landing gear systems are
illustrated by highlighting the severity of a fault thereof – namely, an aircraft accident.
Furthermore, in a study conducted by Goldman et al. (2002) the aircraft systems involved in
accidents were statistically related to the fatalities and injuries occurring, highlighting the
importance of inadequate maintenance of specific aircraft systems.
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Most of the improperly performed maintenance activities were in the form of acts of
omission. For both, Part 121 and Part 135 accidents, acts of omission were responsible for 60%
and 75% of the inadequately performed maintenance activities, respectively. The most prominent
example of an act of omission relates to the afore-quoted Air Midwest Flight 5481, where a
misunderstanding of the maintenance instructions resulted in a technician not performing all the
required steps, creating the accident-causing condition (Hobbs, 2008; NTSB, 2004). Omissions
include both situations where steps explicitly spelled out in the maintenance instructions are not
completed (NTSB, n.d.-c), as well as situations where the maintenance program and instructions
do not include the required and necessary items (NTSB, n.d.-f). The frequency of occurrence of
acts of omissions highlights the importance of performing every maintenance step required and
the need for maintenance instructions to explicitly outline all required maintenance steps. This
includes eliminating any ambivalence in the maintenance instructions to avoid uncertainties
regarding the need to complete specified steps, such as in the event of Air Midwest Flight 5481.
No individual maintenance activity stands out by itself, but rather four categories are
observed to have a 20% occurrence: adjustment, inspections, replacement, and service of aircraft
and equipment, while three categories had an approximately six percent occurrence: AD
compliance, service bulletin/letter implementations, and overhaul. As a wide spread in terms of
maintenance activities is observed, not a singular type of activity is distinguished for individual
error-inducing maintenance instructions. When analyzing the maintenance instructions with
respect to the maintenance activities performed, where the instructions originated from and
whether they were adapted, for instance to meet specific aircraft constraints, their usability,
relevance, and applicability are crucial factors to consider (Zafiharimalala, Robin, & Tricot,
2014). For example, in accident DEN04LA023 (NTSB, n.d.-d), the approved maintenance
instructions adapted for inspections and used by the airline did not match the maintenance
requirements and instructions provided by the manufacturer. A similar discrepancy was reported
in accident NYC06FA128 (NTSB, n.d.-e), where the manufacturer-provided instructions were
not accurately reflected in the job card adapted to the specific operator’s activities, thus missing
crucial maintenance steps. Furthermore, certain type of maintenance activities inherently contain
more detailed instructions than others, causing instructions to be either insufficient in content or
overly detailed, leading technicians to refrain from using the provided documentation
systematically (Zafiharimalala et al., 2014).
The analysis of the accidents applying the PEAR framework provided insight related to
the human factor elements associated to the use of maintenance instructions. As aforementioned,
the most impactful category of the PEAR framework is the Resources category. Under the
HFACS model (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001), resource management is listed as an
organizational influence, impacted by the upper managerial levels. Within the Resources
category, the two most frequent items are procedures and work cards, as well as manuals. As the
analysis performed solely focused on maintenance-related accidents in which the maintenance
instructions are quoted as causal factors, the high frequency of these items can be expected.
Similarly, the relative high frequency of “Maintenance action improperly completed” and
“Maintenance action not completed” under the Action category can be explained by the narrow
focus of the study. Nevertheless, the PEAR analysis highlights that maintenance instructions by
themselves are not able to support the maintenance activities, and that other factors centered
around the human element are required to support the maintenance effort.

A publication of the University Aviation Association, © 2021

15

Zimmermann & Mendonca: Impact of Human Factors & Maintenance Documentation on Aviation Safety

Table 6
PEAR Analysis Results
Accident
Number

Operation

PEAR Elements
Environment
Action
- Maintenance action not
completed
- Sequence of activities

CHI08LA071

Part 121

People
- Psychological characteristics:
Excessive workload

DCA07MA310

Part 121

-

-

-

- Procedures and work cards
- Quality system

DCA06FA058

Part 121

-

-

-

- Procedures and work cards

NYC06FA128

Part 121

-

-

-

- Procedures and work cards
- Manuals

DCA03MA022

Part 121

- Psychological characteristics:
Experience, knowledge, and
training

- Organizational
environment:
Supervision

- Steps required to
perform and complete a
task
- Requirements:
Knowledge

-

WPR14FA068

Part 135

-

-

- Maintenance action not
completed

- Procedures and work cards
- Manuals

WPR12FA332

Part 135

-

-

- Maintenance action
improperly completed

-

CEN10LA389

Part 135

-

-

- Maintenance action not
completed

-

MIA08LA079

Part 135

-

-

- Maintenance action
improperly completed

-

CHI07LA043

Part 135

-

-

LAX05LA244

Part 135

-

-

DEN04LA023

Part 135

-

-
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- Steps required to
perform and complete a
task
- Maintenance action not
completed
- Maintenance action not
completed

16

Resources
- Other people

Procedures and work cards
Manuals
Training
Quality systems

- Procedures and work cards
- Manuals
- Procedures and work cards
- Procedures and work cards
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Table 7
PEAR Analysis Summary
PEAR Items
-

People

Environment

Action

Resources

Psychological characteristics:
Workload
- Psychological characteristics:
Experience
- Psychological characteristics:
Knowledge
- Psychological characteristics:
Training
Total People Items
- Organizational environment:
Supervision
Total Environment Items
- Maintenance action not completed
- Sequence of activities
- Steps required to perform and
complete a task
- Requirements: Knowledge
- Maintenance action improperly
completed
Total Action Items
- Other people
- Procedures and work cards
- Quality system
- Manuals
- Training
Total Resources Items

Part 121
Accidents

Part 135
Accidents

Total

1

-

1

1

-

1

1

-

1

1

-

1

4

-

4

1

-

1

1
1
1

4
-

1
5
1

1

1

2

1

-

1

-

2

2

4

7

11

1
4
2
2
1
10

4
2
6

1
8
2
4
1
16

For instance, the workload, knowledge, experience, and training – all psychological
characteristics outlined under the People category – are PEAR elements related to the selected
accidents. In the United States, the FAA regulates the certification of aircraft maintenance
technicians (AMTs) and dictates the skills (Title 14 C.F.R. § 65.79, 2001), knowledge (Title 14
C.F.R. § 65.75, 1966), and experience (Title 14 C.F.R. § 65.77, 1970) required to be certified to
perform maintenance activities on aircraft. By extension, to work as an AMT, certain recency
requirements are to be met (Title 14 C.F.R. § 65.83, 2014), adding to the knowledge, experience,
and training components. Furthermore, in relation to maintenance instructions, the FAA
stipulates that “a certificated mechanic may not exercise the privileges of his certificate and
rating unless he understands the current instructions of the manufacturer, and the maintenance
manuals, for the specific operation concerned” (Title 14 C.F.R. § 65.81, 1980, para. 2). This
regulation ties training of AMTs to the use and understanding of maintenance instructions,
outlining the importance and criticality of instructions in the realm of aircraft maintenance
activities. However, as presented by the accidents analyzed, a technician’s training, knowledge,
and experience are not the only human-centered factors that affect the technicians’ performance.
On-the-job situational elements, such as the workload, are further crucial, and as such, are to be
considered. Accident number CHI08LA071 (NTSB, n.d.-c) illustrates a scenario in which the
workload influenced the maintenance activities. Specifically, the technicians performing the
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maintenance task on the accident aircraft were called to help another technician and did not
return to the original task, consequently failing to complete outstanding steps of the outlined
maintenance task (NTSB, n.d.-c).
Nevertheless, the front-line technicians are supported by supervisors and quality systems,
which, as shown by the PEAR analysis, can also fail to provide the required safety barriers,
resulting in accident-causing conditions. In the analyzed accidents, one incident of a supervision
failure was recorded under the Environment category of the PEAR framework, while two
instances of quality system deficiencies were noted under the Resources category of the
framework. Both, a quality system and adequate supervision are essential requirements for
aircraft maintenance activities (Shanmugam & Robert, 2015). Per Shanmugam and Robert
(2015), supervision can be classified into two main categories. First, relating to the required level
of supervision, supervision is a managerial component. Second, relating to the supervision
policy, supervision is an element associated with the certification of staff and technicians, thus
tying back to the FAA-mandated AMT certification requirements afore-discussed. The quality
system is its own category, and contains, amongst others, the following elements: quality and
safety policy, quality review meetings, approval of document, and competency assessment
(Shanmugam & Robert, 2015).
The accident of Air Midwest Flight 5481 provides a perfect example of a scenario in
which both, supervision and quality system issues tied to maintenance instructions resulted in an
accident-causing situation. Specifically, the supervisor of the technician performing the cable
rigging operation – which resulted in the accident condition – was also in charge of quality
assurance and further misunderstood the rigging instructions, agreeing to skip the steps in the
instructions (NTSB, 2004). As aforementioned, skipping certain steps of the maintenance
instructions during the rigging process ultimately restricted the aircraft’s pitch control, resulting
in the accident of the aircraft (NTSB, 2004).
Limitations
The current study experienced some limitations. These factors ranged from the data
sources used, the classification framework, and the scope of the analyzed accidents. First, the
selection of accidents included a manual filtering process, in which accidents reports dated
within the specified timeframe including the keyword “maintenance” were filtered. However, as
a keyword search was employed, accident reports not meeting the keyword search criteria but
still falling under the overall research framework may have been missed, and thus excluded from
the analysis. Similarly, the data used for the classification of the causal factors of the accidents
was retrieved from the accident reports provided by the NTSB. Consequently, the analysis was
limited and restricted to the information provided by the NTSB reports. Furthermore, the detail
provided by the NTSB reports varied across accidents, as certain accident reports included data
from interviews and laboratory analyses, while others merely described the factual accident
information. To expand and enhance the PEAR analysis performed, the information from the
NTSB provided reports could be supplemented with further research into the accident causal
factors, specifically with relation to maintenance documentation.
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Due to the afore-described lack of detail in certain NTSB-provided reports, two
additional PEAR categories were added to the PEAR analysis. As previously explained, the
added categories accounted for the ambiguity and indefiniteness in the NTSB reports, but in
return provided little detail in terms of human factor-related accident causal factors. By
extension, the classification of the causal factors into the PEAR categories was based on the
researchers’ interpretation of the accident information provided, and thus includes a certain level
of subjectivity. Furthermore, the scope of the accident reviewed is comparatively narrow, as it
restricted to 15 years of accidents occurring under Part 121 and Part 135 operations in the United
States. To expand the applicability and generalizability of the results obtained, the research
framework could be applied to accidents occurring under Part 91 operations, outside of the
United States, or in an expanded timeframe.
Conclusion
The analysis performed furthered the study and understanding of human factors in the
field of aircraft maintenance, highlighting the impact and associated importance of maintenance
documentation. Acts of omission – where a required maintenance step is not performed – were
identified to be the most frequent error type, while the aircraft systems most subjected to
instruction-related errors were the landing gear, powerplant, and flight control systems. Relating
to human factors, trends identified by the applied PEAR model could be tied to FAA training
requirements for aircraft technicians while simultaneously mirroring and furthering the results of
previous human factors studies performed in the field of aviation. Specifically, the importance
and relevance of factors supporting the aircraft maintenance efforts with a specific focus on the
instructions used therein, such as available resources as well as the overall environment, were
found to be crucial.
The findings support the idea that aviation safety is a combination of multiple elements
working together. As stated in previous research, and highlighted through the results of the
completed study, the existence of written maintenance instructions does not warrant the proper
completion of the associated maintenance items. Instead, supporting elements such as technician
training as well as adequate supervision and the overall working environment are key factors
affecting the adequate maintenance of aircraft. The HFACS model discussed in literature as well
as in the discussion of the results, reflects similar aspects. While the maintenance errors occur at
the front line (the Action category of the PEAR framework), underlying factors – i.e.
maintenance documentation in this study – often stem from managerial and regulatory levels. As
aforementioned, people-related aspects such as training, experience, and knowledge, are
primarily being addressed by FAA-regulated training for aviation maintenance technicians. On
the other hand, elements under the Resources and Environment categories identified under the
PEAR framework in this study, are frequently intrinsically tied to managerial and organizational
elements of maintenance organizations. Consequently, to continuously increase the safety of
aviation, when designing and implementing maintenance instructions, elements that contribute to
the actual understanding and implementation of said instructions – i.e. considering the “working
environment” thereof – are critical and need to be considered.
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